Financial Reform
Public Moral Hazard in Solutions to Private Moral Hazard, Illustrated by Macro-Financial Policy Regimes Response to Hélène Rey
Powerful states should avoid using their power and international organisations they dominate to prescribe general measures to developing-economy states because we have not yet overcome our own obvious problems. Doing so also harms our position in the world. Good policies can speak for themselves. We can usefully try to describe our mistakes, problems, and what we think we have learned. There are important illustrations in the 2022-23 inflationary and banking problems. They are rooted in moral hazard within and across organs of the state, which are problems still largely ignored within political economy and science. READ MORE
Weekend Reading: Norms, Incentives & Putting Banking into a Market Economy
The public image of finance and financiers, on both sides of the Atlantic, is poor. Perceived as cynical about customers and the rules of the game, they parade as Homo economicus in a world of caveat emptor, buyer beware. But bailed out by taxpayers in 2008, again in 2023, and countless times in the past, this supposed embodiment of the free-market spirit turns out to be semi-socialised when things go wrong. No wonder people are fed up.
Who wouldn’t like to keep the upside while laying off the downside? Only the few get so lucky, however. Worse, they can effectively self-select by taking systemic risks. READ MORE
Supervision in Comparative Perspective,
Britain’s Liability-Driven Investment Episode Was a Canary No One Elsewhere Bothered to Think About,
Lender of last resort regimes must improve in wake of Credit Suisse,
Shadow Banking and the UK’s FPC,
US Equity Trading Squeezes, and Volatility: Amber Alert of Financial System Fragilities,
Reigniting Reforms to Ensure a Resilient and Stable Financial System: a Second Phase?,
Banking Culture: Regulatory Arbitrage, Values, and Honest Conduct,
Resolution policy and systemic risk: Five entreaties,
Rules Versus Principles in Financial Regulation Following the Crisis: It All Depends On the Purpose,
BOOK REVIEW by Ernst Baltensperger,
Is the financial system sufficiently resilient: a research programme and policy agenda,
Comments regarding the eSLR and Volcker Rule,
Is The Financial System Sufficiently Resilient?,
Resolution Policy and Resolvability at the Centre of Financial Stability Regimes?,
What is macroprudential policy for? ,
The Design and Governance of Financial Stability Regimes,
Towards a “new normal” in financial markets?,
How can central banks deliver credible commitment and be “emergency institutions”?,
Wall Street Journal: Post-Crisis Risk Casts a Darkening Shadow,
The resolution of financial institutions without taxpayer solvency support,
Bank regulators need strong principles and firm rules,
