Former central banker Paul Tucker is the chair of the Systemic Risk Council, a Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, and author of Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State. 

LONG BIO

The political economy of Central Bank balance sheet management

Columbia University, New York City      

Once we are back to something recognizable as sustainable macroeconomic conditions, will central bank balance sheets remain very, even spectacularly large; should the monetary authorities continue, routinely or occasionally, to intervene in a range of asset markets; if they were to do so, to what ends, aggregate-demand management or substituting for broken markets that impede the transmission of monetary policy; should they be free to set negative marginal rates but carry on paying positive rates on the bulk of their liabilities; and should they seek to steer risk premia as well as the risk-free rate of interest?

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