Political Economy
Public Moral Hazard in Solutions to Private Moral Hazard, Illustrated by Macro-Financial Policy Regimes Response to Hélène Rey
Powerful states should avoid using their power and international organisations they dominate to prescribe general measures to developing-economy states because we have not yet overcome our own obvious problems. Doing so also harms our position in the world. Good policies can speak for themselves. We can usefully try to describe our mistakes, problems, and what we think we have learned. There are important illustrations in the 2022-23 inflationary and banking problems. They are rooted in moral hazard within and across organs of the state, which are problems still largely ignored within political economy and science. READ MORE
Political realism via pragmatic genealogy or social contracting?
Albert Weale raises two related points about my book Global Discord. One is whether deploying David Hume reduces everything to a narrow conception of mutual advantage. The other is to suggest that a suitably empirical social contractarianism can deliver more than my synthesis of Hume and Bernard Williams. I respond to both points, on the way explaining why Hume and Williams need each other to generate a political realism that, without ejecting ethics, has things to say about institutions. Being able to represent a community’s legitimation norms in contractual terms does not mean their force is rooted in contracting (hypothetical or actual). Pragmatic genealogy offers an alternative way of theorising about politics realistically. READ MORE
The Fragile Equilibrium of Technology, Liberty and Power (preview of new book project),
Does the ECB Care about Inflation?,
An interview with Sir Paul Tucker,
The Fed appointments process should be overhauled,
Do we need a new constitution for central banking?,
BOOK REVIEW: Making a Modern Central Bank: The Bank of England 1979–2003,
Central Banking and the Rule of Law,
Do Central Banks Serve the People?,
Renewing Our Monetary Vows: Open Letters to the Governor of the Bank of England,
Is the Age of Independent Central Banks Over, and Should We Care?,
Solvency As a Fundamental Constraint on LOIR Policy,
Have Central Banks and Independent Regulators Replaced Constitutional Democracy?,
The best books on The Administrative State recommended by Paul Tucker,
Till Time’s Last Stand or How Standing Still is Valuable but Uncomfortable,
Reining in Technocracy to Increase Democratic Legitimacy,
The political economy of central banking in the digital age,
The political economy of Central Bank balance sheet management,
The only game in town: A new constitution for money (and credit) policy,
Is there an incipient crisis in securities regulations?,
The lender of last resort and modern central banking: principles and reconstruction,
Capital regulation in the new world: The political economy of regime change,
