Political Economy
Fiscal, Monetary and Macroprudential Regimes: Incentives-Values Compatibility in Constitutional Democracies
I have been asked to write something about the appropriate institutional structure for monetary, macroprudential and fiscal policies in an environment of persistently low interest rates. That is one important plausible scenario the macroeconomic regime needs to be capable of coping with, but not the only one as we are being reminded by recent inflationary cost shocks and excess demand. There are others too, such as banking crises. READ MORE
Antitrust and Rule by Judges
ProMarket, June 2022 – The early-1980s Posner-Stigler memorandum to incoming president Reagan’s transition team is interesting for a host of reasons, but most of all in terms of constitutionalism’s values. READ MORE
The Fed appointments process should be overhauled,
Do we need a new constitution for central banking?,
BOOK REVIEW: Making a Modern Central Bank: The Bank of England 1979–2003,
Central Banking and the Rule of Law,
Do Central Banks Serve the People?,
Renewing Our Monetary Vows: Open Letters to the Governor of the Bank of England,
Is the Age of Independent Central Banks Over, and Should We Care?,
Solvency As a Fundamental Constraint on LOIR Policy,
Have Central Banks and Independent Regulators Replaced Constitutional Democracy?,
The best books on The Administrative State recommended by Paul Tucker,
Till Time’s Last Stand or How Standing Still is Valuable but Uncomfortable,
Reining in Technocracy to Increase Democratic Legitimacy,
The political economy of central banking in the digital age,
The political economy of Central Bank balance sheet management,
The only game in town: A new constitution for money (and credit) policy,
Is there an incipient crisis in securities regulations?,
The lender of last resort and modern central banking: principles and reconstruction,
Capital regulation in the new world: The political economy of regime change,
