Political Economy
Do we need a new constitution for central banking?
Economics Observatory
The global financial crisis, persistently weak growth and now Covid-19 have created tensions between politics and central banking. The time is ripe for a refreshed constitution, making clear the purpose of independent central banks, and what should fall to fiscal authorities.
BOOK REVIEW: Making a Modern Central Bank: The Bank of England 1979–2003
When in 1997 the Bank of England regained independence, the long arc of its 20th century history reached closure: from great power before the 1930s, to decades sidelined as the Treasury’s operational branch, through reacquired authority during the late 1970s and 1980s, and finally back to insulation from quotidian politics. The destination was not inevitable, and the job of this book, covering the quarter century from 1979 to 2003, is to tell the tale of how a remarkable group built an organization fit to be granted independence when the politicians and mandarins ran out of monetary wheezes. It has the right title (almost) and an appropriate cover, as Eddie George—perhaps the finest central banker in the generation after Paul Volcker—embodied the transition from old to new.
Central Banking and the Rule of Law,
Do Central Banks Serve the People?,
Renewing Our Monetary Vows: Open Letters to the Governor of the Bank of England,
Is the Age of Independent Central Banks Over, and Should We Care?,
Solvency As a Fundamental Constraint on LOIR Policy,
Have Central Banks and Independent Regulators Replaced Constitutional Democracy?,
The best books on The Administrative State recommended by Paul Tucker,
Till Time’s Last Stand or How Standing Still is Valuable but Uncomfortable,
Reining in Technocracy to Increase Democratic Legitimacy,
The political economy of central banking in the digital age,
The political economy of Central Bank balance sheet management,
The only game in town: A new constitution for money (and credit) policy,
Is there an incipient crisis in securities regulations?,
The lender of last resort and modern central banking: principles and reconstruction,
Capital regulation in the new world: The political economy of regime change,
